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   1 
Introduction 
In the grow-out phase a broiler production, a processing firm, referred to as an integrator, 
contracts with growers to raise chickens to slaughter weight.  The integrator supplies chicks, 
feed, medicines, and technical advice to growers.  Growers provide facilities, labor, and the 
remaining inputs necessary for raising chickens.  The contract between the grower and integrator 
specifies a formula that is used to measure the grower’s efficiency of converting integrator 
supplied inputs into pounds of slaughter weight chickens.  This measure is called the standard 
cost.  The contract also specifies a method of determining the grower’s compensation in terms of 
this standard cost.   
Broiler growers are compensated almost universally according to a two-part piece rate 
tournament (Vukina).  The essential features of such a tournament consist of a base payment per 
pound of live weight and a bonus payment determined by a grower’s standard cost relative to 
others.  Growers with relatively low (high) standard costs receive a positive (negative) bonus 
payment.
1  Tournament payment schemes are dominant in the grow-out phase of the broiler 
industry, more so than in the grow-out phases of other livestock and poultry industries (Knoeber; 
Tsoulouhas and Vukina).  Knoeber describes how tournaments align incentives, reduce 
measurement costs, facilitate innovation, and lower the need for contract renegotiation in the 
presence of rapid technical change.  Knoeber and Thurman (1995) show that basing 
compensation on relative performance shifts output price risk and common production risk from 
growers to integrators in a manner that improves incentives and lowers risk bearing costs.  The 
predominance of tournaments in broiler grow-out has also been attributed to structural 
                                                 
1 The term “tournament” is used more broadly than is sometimes found in the literature.  Knoeber and Thurman 
(1994) distinguish between tournaments and linear relative performance evaluations.  They use the former term for 
compensation schemes based on relative rankings and the latter for compensation schemes based off of the mean or 
other measure of the center of the distribution.     2 
characteristics.  In broiler grow-out, there are many more growers signed up with a particular 
integrator than is true of other livestock or poultry industries.  This means that tournaments to do 
a better job of averaging out common production risk (Knoeber).  Tsoulouhas and Vukina show 
that tournaments are less feasible when growers are concerned about integrator bankruptcy and 
argue that the predominance of tournaments is due to the large size of broiler processors and the 
price behavior of the broiler output market, both of which reduce bankruptcy concerns.  
While there is much in the previous literature that suggests tournaments are well suited to 
the situation of broiler production, it is also apparent that the alignment of incentives and the 
efficiency of outcomes is influenced by more than the relative payment provisions of 
tournaments.  For example, Lewin presents arguments suggesting a direct correlation between 
the relationship specificity of grower investments and strength of grower incentives, and 
Goodhue uses asymmetric information arguments to explain why integrators control key inputs 
for broiler grow-out.  One need only look at broiler contracts themselves for alterations of the 
incentive structure of tournament payment schemes.  It is not uncommon for contracts to specify 
allowances for fuel during winter months or to provide an increase in the base payment for 
growers with facilities that meet certain criteria.  Such provisions acknowledge that the expected 
pay schedule under tournaments is not always sufficient to motivate the actions desired by the 
integrator, at least when it comes to capital improvements or optimal use of some grower 
supplied inputs.   
Another aspect of the contractual relationship is the size and frequency of flock 
placements growers receive from the integrator.  From an integrator cost minimization 
standpoint alone, it would not be surprising to see lower cost growers receive larger and/or more 
frequent placements.  Goodhue, Rausser, and Simon use an agency theory model to develop   3 
hypothesized relationships regarding flock placements and grower ability.  Their empirical 
results suggest that high ability growers do receive larger flocks.  They find insignificant 
evidence that high ability growers receive more frequent flocks, but their results do suggest that 
higher ability growers face less variability in layout times between flocks.  The size and 
frequency of placements can also be a source of grower risk.  As found by Knoeber and Thurman 
broiler contracts shift output price risk from the grower to the integrator. However, growers may 
face risk in the form of size and frequency of placements as integrators change capacity 
utilization rates in response to changes in output price (Goodhue).   
In what follows, we construct an example to illustrate how the size and frequency of 
flock placements can be used to differentiate grower incentives by grower abilities.  We use a 
math program to model an integrator’s problem of assigning growers into settlement pools.  In 
making these pool assignments, the integrator is assumed to have some flexibility in the number 
of birds placed and the frequency of placements to growers of a given ability.  The implications 
for grower incentives that result from the solution of our example reflect behavior under perfect 
information.  Our intent is not to suggest that problems related to imperfect information are 
unimportant to the design and outcome of contractual relationships in the broiler industry.  
Studies mentioned above suggest otherwise.  Rather the simplicity of a math programming 
framework allows us to hold constant key parameters of the model, arrive at some fairly 
straightforward relationships between placements and grower abilities, and examine how these 
relationships affect the incentive structure.   
   4 
Approach 
The integrator’s problem is to minimize the costs of sourcing enough broilers each week to meet 
its slaughter capacity requirement.  We assume that all growers are under a contract that contains 
the following payment provisions: 
(1)  a base payment rate of $0.04 per pound of live weight, net of condemned birds;  
(2)  a bonus payment calculated as the difference between the average standard cost of the 
settlement pool and the grower’s standard cost; and 
(3)  a minimum payment of $0.03 per pound of live weight, regardless of grower standard 
cost.   
In the model, differences in grower ability are represented by different grower types.  We are 
assuming that the integrator can classify growers into types characterized by standard costs and 
that the integrator knows the grow-out capacity available from each grower type classification.   
In a typical broiler grow-out situation, six weeks are required to grow chicks to slaughter 
weight.  This is followed by a 1 to 3 week layout time before another flock is placed.  For 
purposes of the model we allow the integrator to vary time between flock placements anywhere 
from 7 to 9 weeks.  We also consider the possibility that the integrator may give short flocks – 
place a number of chicks with a grower that is smaller than 100 percent of grower’s capacity.  If 
the integrator provides a short flock, we assume that it is at least 80 percent of the grower’s full 
capacity.   
As a math program, the integrators problem assignment problem can be expressed as 
follows:    5 
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i = (1, 2, …, M) indexes the types of growers 
j = (1, 2, … ,.N) indexes the settlement pools 
i = a unit vector of dimension N×1  
 
Endogenous variables in the model are  
zi:   an N×1 vector of intensity variables with elements (zij) representing amount of available 
grow-out capacity (in terms of number of birds) from the i
th type of grower used to fill the 
j
th pool.   
mj:   the mean standard cost (per pound of. live weight) of growers used for the j
th pool 
bij:   an intermediate term used to enforce minimum payment provision of the broiler contract 
pij:   the payment (per pound of live weight), for the i
th type of grower used to fill the j
th 
settlement pool.   
 
Exogenous coefficient in the model are:   6 
w:  Average weight per bird (assumed to be 5 pounds in this example and 
constant across growers and pools) 
ci:  Standard cost of type i growers. 
yi:   Available grow-out capacity (number of birds) of growers of type i  
x:  Number of birds per pool needed to meet the integrator’s slaughter 
capacity.
2   
 
G and H:   Coefficient matrices of dimension N×N used for the temporal flock 
placement constraints. 
 
Explanations of the equations in the model are as follows.   
§  The objective function is the integrators cost of growing broilers over a given planning 
horizon and reflects both the cost of inputs provided by the integrator (the ci) and 
payments to growers for their services (the pij).   
 
§  Constraints 1 and 2 are temporal flock placement constraints.  Constraint 1 ensures that 
the capacity from type i growers used to fill pools in any 7 week period does not exceed 
the available capacity from type i growers.  The coefficient matrix G in constraint 1 
enforces this minimum time between flock placements.  Table 1, depicts G as a 
coefficient tableau. 
 
                                                 
2 Note that in the formulation above, the weekly capacity requirement is constant across weeks. This could easily be 
relaxed to accommodate differences in weekly capacities over the integrator’s planning horizon.   7 
§  Constraint 2 requires that type i growers receive at least one flock every 9 weeks.  In 
tableau form, the matrix H is similar to G, except row 1 would have the value of 1 in 
columns 1 through 9, row 2 would have the value of 1 in columns 2 through 10, etc.  The 
formulation of constraint 2 allows for short flocks that are no smaller than 80 percent of a 
full flock.   
 
§  Constraint 3 requires that enough birds are assigned to each pool to meet the integrators 
weekly slaughter capacity requirements.   
 
§  Constraints 4-6 are used to compute payments for the different grower types.  
Specifically, constraint 4 is used to define the average standard cost of the j
th pool while 
constraints 5 and 6 enforce the minimum payment provision and define pay for the 
grower type, respectively. 
 
Data and assumptions 
Data were collected that reflect 896 grower observations from 55 pools settled between 
1997 and 2001.  The data include growers contracted with three different integrators.  Regardless 
of integrator, however, each grower observation provides the information necessary to compute 
standard costs according to an arbitrary contract specification.  Four actual grower contracts were 
examined.  Three of these were actual contracts used by growers in the dataset, and the fourth 
reflected an integrator complex located in the same geographic region but for which we had no 
grower data.  Each contract specifies grower standard costs as [a(FEED USED)+b(HEAD 
PLACED)] ÷ (NET POUNDS), where NET POUNDS is total pounds of live weight net of   8 
condemned birds.  The a and b terms differ among the contracts examined.  We apply the fourth 
contract (which specified a = 0.10 and b = 0.138) to all observations to obtain a series of 
standard costs.   
Ideally, each observation on grower standard costs would reflect the same weather 
conditions and same quality of integrator supplied inputs such as chicks, feed, and support 
services.  In this ideal situation, variations in standard costs could be attributed to differences in 
grower effort, quality of grower supplied inputs, and randomness.  Because our data reflect 
potential differences in the quality of integrator supplied inputs and were generated under a 
variety of weather conditions, we construct a new series of grower standard costs after 
controlling, to the extent possible, for factors outside of the growers control.   
To approximate a distribution of grower costs under identical grow-out conditions, we 
regress the computed standard cost on fixed pool effects, the number of chicks placed, and a 
squared term for the number of chicks placed.  The rationale behind this regression model is as 
follows:  All growers within a given pool are contracted with the same integrator (should face 
similar quality of integrator inputs) and would have been subject to similar weather conditions 
(because pools are comprised of flocks grown during the same time period).  The number of 
chicks placed will be directly related to the number of houses a grower owns and can be used to 
control for the possibility of non-constant returns to scale in the grow-out phase of broiler 
production.  We use the residuals from this regression to construct a new series of grower 
standard costs as: 
(2)    i i e c c + = , 
where  232 . 0 = c is the mean of the original standard cost series (or predicted cost at the mean of 
all regressors).     9 
  The R
2 value of the regression model just described was 0.347 and the adjusted R
2 value 
was 0.303.  The coefficients on the head placed variables are of the expected sign but are small 
in magnitude and insignificant.  The coefficient for head placed was -8.01447E-8 with a p value 
of 0.123.  The coefficient for the squared term was 4.03821E-13 with a p value of 0.216.  Figure 
1 provides an empirical cumulative density function (CDF) for the new standard cost series 
created from regression residuals according to equation 2.  This CDF is used to define grower 
types in terms of $0.005 differences in standard cost, with the lowest cost growers (type 1 
growers) having standard costs of $0.21 per pound of live weight and the highest cost growers 
(type 11 growers) having standard costs of $0.26 per pound.   
To implement the math program in equation 1, we assume that the integrator has a 
baseline processing capacity of x = 1.2 million birds per week (10 shifts per week at 120,000 
birds per shift) and that, on average, growers receive a flock every 8 weeks.  Thus the integrator 
must sign up enough growers to provide 9.6 million birds during any 8 week period.  This 9.6 
million bird grow-out capacity is divided among the different grower types according to table 2.  
Percentiles for the different grower types, reported in table 2, are from the empirical CDF in 
figure 1. 
Once growers are signed up, we assume the integrator learns about grower ability and can 
classify growers according to standard costs.  The integrator can use this classification to make 
pool assignments, lengthen or shorten placement times, and/or reduce the size of flocks placed 
with growers of a particular type.  As described above, our model assumes that time between 
flock placements can vary between 7 and 9 weeks and that the integrator can reduce flock 
placements to 80 percent of a full flock.  Thus, the available grow-out capacities reported in table 
2 represent the maximum number of birds available from a given type of grower during any 7   10 
week period.  These grow-out capacities are used as values for the yi parameters in the math 
program.   
The model in equation 1 has a nonlinear objective function and is solved with the 
MINOS solver available through GAMS software. The dimensions of the model depend in large 
part on the 7 week minimum and 9 week maximum time requirements placed on flock 
placements.  A full characterization of the integrator’s problem requires that the model 
incorporate a 63 pools (N=63).  We solve the model at the baseline integrator processing 
capacity of 1.2 million birds per week and for lower and higher capacity levels ranging from 0.95 
million (79 percent of baseline capacity) to 1.3 million (108 percent of baseline capacity) in 
increments of 0.05 million.
3   
Results 
  The solution to the integrator’s pool assignment problem can be used to determine flock 
placement rates, payments, and revenues for the different grower cost types.  This information is 
summarized in Table 3 for the baseline integrator capacity of 1.2 million birds per week.  To 
facilitate interpretation of the results, output from the programming model -- based on 63 pools -- 
is converted to an annual basis by the ratio 52/63.  Values are also adjusted to have a per house 
interpretation assuming 18,000 birds per house and an average of 5 pounds per bird.   
  The integrator’s solution involves maximizing the use of grow-out capacity from the 
lowest cost growers and minimizing the use of capacity from the high cost growers.  For grower 
types 1 through 5, those with costs of $0.23 and below, constraint 1 is binding for each of the 63 
                                                 
3 Starting values for the model variables did affect the local optima returned by the MINOS solver.  Among the 
starting strategies we considered, that which provided the smallest locally optimal solution was to use the solution to 
a linear version of the model to get a feasible starting point for the zij.  The linear version excluded constraints 4 
through 6 and the second term in the objective function.  Although solutions are sensitive to starting values, 
differences in the objective function at local optima were small, the ratio of smallest to largest objective function 
values ranged from 0.999 to 0.992 over the various levels of integrator processing capacity.     11 
pools.  The integrator places a full flock with these growers at 7 week intervals for 7.43 full 
flocks per year.  For grower types 7 through 11, those with costs of 0.24 and above, constraint 2 
is binding for each of 63 pools.  These growers receive a short flock that is 80 percent of a full 
flock once every 9 weeks.  This is equivalent to 4.62 full flocks per year.  For grower type 6 with 
a standard cost of 0.235, constraint 1 was binding in 42 of the 63 pools, and constraint 2 was 
never binding.  Growers of this type receive the equivalent of 7.07 full flocks per year with an 
occasional short flock or delayed placement.  These results are intuitive.  The standard cost 
represents chicks and feed supplied by an integrator and constitutes the largest part of the 
integrator’s cost of sourcing broilers.  Naturally an integrator would favor growers with low 
standard costs and seek to use low-cost growers to the greatest extent possible.   
What is probably more interesting is the potential for variation in placements to 
complement the incentive structure of the grower tournament.  Figure 2 presents (1) grower 
payment curves, (2) grower revenue curves, and (3) change in grower revenue curves resulting 
from ½ cent cost reductions.  The grower payment curve is read off the left axis.  The revenue 
and change in revenue curves are read of the right axis.  The solid curves are calculated from the 
solution to our model and reflect the possibility of delayed placements and short flocks.  The 
dashed curves in the figure are calculated under the assumption that the integrator gives each 
grower 1 full flock every 8 weeks and is used to illustrate the payment and incentive structure of 
the tournament in the absence of variable placements.
4   
The payment curve from the constant 8-week placement schedule can be summarized as 
follows.  Growers with costs of $0.245 and higher receive the minimum payment of $0.03 per 
pound.  For growers with costs below $0.245 per pound, payments increase at a constant rate as 
                                                 
4Recall that the integrator signs up just enough growers to meet the weekly capacity of 1.2 million birds.  If we 
impose the 8 week placement schedule for all growers, the model is just feasible and the integrator uses 1/8 of the 
capacity from each grower type for each pool.    12 
costs are reduced.  The payment curve under the model solution is similar.  Again, growers with 
costs of $0.245 and above receive the minimum payment or something very close to the 
minimum.
5  At costs below 0.245, payments follow a pattern similar to that shown for the 8 week 
placement schedule.  However, there is more variation in the rate of payment increases, and the 
payment curve calculated from the model solution is usually below the payment curve calculated 
under the assumption of 8 week placements.  This can be attributed the fact that in the model 
solution, low cost growers are used more intensely than high cost growers resulting in an excess 
of grow-out capacity that allows pools to be formed that lower bonus payments.   
The payment structure of the tournament has implications for grower incentives.  It is 
useful to highlight these before moving on to a discussion about the revenue and change in 
revenue curves.  One implication is that the tournament provides little, if any, incentive for 
incremental improvements by highest cost growers.  In the present example, if a $0.255 grower 
were to improve and become a $0.250 grower, he still gets the minimum payment and there is no 
reward for the additional effort or expenditures that were necessary to make the ½ cent 
improvement.  While the highest cost growers face little incentive for incremental improvements, 
all other growers face roughly the same incentive under the tournament payment curve.  For 
example, the change in payment that results when one improves from a $0.24 grower to a $0.235 
grower is about the same as that which could be expected by a $0.215 grower that improves to a 
$0.210 grower.  
Let us consider the payment structure from the integrator’s perspective.  First of all, 
would an integrator want an incentive structure that is essentially flat for high cost growers?  An 
intuitive answer would be no, but there are arguments that the flat portion of the payment curve 
                                                 
5 Constraint 5 always holds with equality for high cost growers, those with costs of 0.25 and above (grower types 9-
11).  These growers receive the minimum payment of $0.03 per pound each time they participate in a pool.  
Constraint 5 is binding the vast majority of the time for growers with costs of $0.245 (type 8 growers).     13 
might not be very problematic in practice.  Note from the frequency distribution of grower types 
(table 3) that the highest cost growers, those with no incentives for small improvements, 
constitute a small portion of the total grow-out capacity available to the integrator.  In fact, less 
than 7 percent of the grower capacity faces no increase in payment as a result of a ½ cent cost 
reduction.  Second, it could be that at highest cost levels, improvements are only possible 
through substantial capital expenditures to upgrade grow-out facilities.  If this were true, the 
payment structure does provide incentives for the large improvements that could result from such 
expenditures.  In other words, incentives for incremental improvements may be of less 
importance at the highest standard cost levels.  A third argument is that the flat portion of the 
payment curve is an artifact of our model and the assumptions behind it.  If this is true, the 
solution to our model does not reflect all of the incentives that high cost growers face in the real 
world.  For example, growers that consistently receive the minimum payment are probably at the 
most risk of termination by the integrator.  This is a potentially large incentive for improvement 
that is not reflected in the payment structure and would not otherwise be reflected in the results 
of our model.   
Moving on to the second question, would an integrator want a payment curve that is 
relatively constant for all growers below a certain cost threshold?  Here the answer must be no.  
To see why refer once again to the frequency of grower types.  Suppose that the integrator could 
choose between a marginal improvement by the $0.235 growers and a marginal improvement by 
the $0.215 growers.  The integrator would naturally prefer the improvement in the $0.235 
growers for the simple reason that there is a lot more of them.  After all, $0.235 growers 
comprise close to 28 percent of grower capacity, while $0.215 growers comprise less than 2 
percent.  If the $0.235 growers can be convinced that they need to lower costs by ½ cent the   14 
integrator stands to save a great deal more money than would result from convincing the $0.215 
growers to do the same.  If this is in fact what the integrator would prefer, then the incentive for 
improvement should not be constant and $0.235 growers should face a more powerful incentive 
for improvement.   
  The solution to our model suggests that variable placements play a role in differentiating 
incentives by grower cost type.  Note that under the assumption of constant 8-week placements, 
the revenue curve follows the same general pattern as the payment curve and all growers below a 
certain cost level can expect the same change in revenue to result from an incremental 
improvement in standard costs.  The curves based on the model solution differ in that the 
revenue curve becomes steep over the $0.240 to $0.230 cost range and marginal revenue is 
relatively large.  It is over this cost range where the integrator transitions growers from the 9 
week placement schedule with short flocks to the 7 week placement schedule with full flocks.  In 
the model solution, growers with costs of $0.240 have the largest incentive for improvement, 
followed by growers with costs of $0.235.  Together, these growers account for 44 percent of the 
integrator’s grow-out capacity.  In our example, the carrot (or stick) of placement frequency 
provides a relatively large incentive to a substantial portion of the integrators growers.   
The importance of placements to these incentives is illustrated in table 3.  If a grower 
with a given number of pounds (Q) and receiving a corresponding payment (P) changes his 
performance, then the corresponding change in revenue can be decomposed as follows: 
(4)  DR = DP×Q+DQ×P+DP×DQ.   
For discussion purposes, we will refer to the first term as the payment effect, the second term as 
the placement effect, and third term as the interaction affect.  All growers with costs of $0.250 
and below would expect a payment effect in return for ½ cent improvement.  When   15 
improvements bring the potential for larger and more frequent flocks, the placement effect can 
be large and important.   In our example, the placement effect provides a large incentive for the 
$0.240 growers. In fact, the revenue curve suggests a 62 percent increase for a ½ cent 
improvement in performance. 
  The notion of a placement effect explains differences in revenue possibilities that would 
occur if the integrator changes slaughter capacity, say, in response to changes demand for the 
final product.  Figure 3, depicts the revenue curve at the baseline capacity of 1.2 million birds per 
week along with spreads around that baseline for capacities of 0.95 million birds to 1.3 million 
birds in increments of 0.05 million.  Regardless of capacity level, the highest cost growers, those 
with costs of $0.245 and above receive 9 week placements, 80 percent flocks, and per pound 
payments that are at or near minimum.  Consequently, revenues for these growers are largely 
unaffected by changes in slaughter capacity.  This conclusion assumes, of course, that the 
integrator does not terminate high cost growers when slaughter volume is cut back.  Conversely, 
the integrator places as many birds as she can with the lowest cost growers, those with costs of 
0.220 and below.  At each capacity level, these growers get full flocks on a 7 week placement 
schedule.
6  The spread in revenue possibilities for these low cost growers is due solely to 
differences in optimal pool composition at the different capacity levels.  Growers in the middle, 
those with costs of $0.240, $0.235, and $0.230, have revenue outcomes that can change 
dramatically in response to a change in slaughter capacity.  This is shown by the wide spread in 
revenue possibilities relative to either the low cost or high cost growers.  Again, revenue 
fluctuations are due in part to differences in pool composition at different capacity levels that 
                                                 
6 Except at the lowest 0.95 million slaughter capacity, $0.225 growers were also assigned full flocks and 7-week 
placements.     16 
affect bonus payments.  However, the relatively wide spread in revenue outcomes results from 
these growers being subject to changes in the size and/or frequency of placements.  
  The important point here is that variable placements can provide an incentive in the form 
of narrowing the spread of revenue possibilities.  To illustrate, consider a $0.230 grower.  At the 
baseline capacity of 1.2 million birds the revenue curve would indicate that a ½ cent 
improvement would increase revenue per house by 4.4 percent, from $29,551 to $30,859.  Under 
the baseline, this incentive is small relative to other growers.  Our $0.230 grower is already 
receiving full flocks on a 7 week schedule so there is no placement effect that amplifies his 
payment incentive under the tournament.  However, the ½ cent improvement would greatly 
narrow the spread of revenue possibilities and this may be an important augmentation to the 
payment incentive.  In short, the improvement would all but insure the continuation of full flocks 
in the event of a capacity decline. 
 
Discussion 
  The example suggests that differentiating the size and frequency of placements by grower 
cost types can impact grower incentives in a way that gives some growers greater incentives for 
incremental improvement than others.  Provided there is some degree of excess grow-out 
capacity, this conclusion arises out of cost minimizing behavior on part of the integrator.  In our 
example, the integrator used a constant 8-week placement schedule and recruited enough 
growers to meet weekly capacity.  Once growers are signed up, the integrator can differentiate 
growers according to standard costs, and the solution to the integrator’s sourcing problem leads 
to excess grow-out capacity because the integrator uses the capacity of low cost growers more 
intensively than that of the high cost growers.  The differentiation of incentives occurs because   17 
some growers receive a placement incentive in addition to a higher in bonus payment under the 
tournament.  The results of our example indicate that these placement incentives can be large. 
It is important to emphasize that the amount of excess grow-out capacity will affect the 
incentive structure.  Other things equal, a greater degree of excess capacity will shift the 
placement incentives to lower cost growers and a lesser degree of excess capacity will shift the 
placement incentives to the higher cost growers.  One argument made above is that if the 
integrator faces a grower cost distribution that is similar to that used in this example, she might 
target grow-out capacity levels so that mid-range growers receive the placement incentives.  The 
point being that there are lots of mid-range growers and giving them the placement incentives 
maximizes the percentage of growers that receive the strongest incentives for improvement.   
Another consideration in determining which growers should receive the placement 
incentive relates to situations where the tournament pay schedule is insufficient to motivate 
desired actions.  For example, it is common for broiler contracts specify an increase in the base 
payment to growers that have houses or equipment meeting certain criteria.  In essence, the 
integrator recognizes that a potential increase in bonus payments alone may not be sufficient to 
motivate the desired capital upgrades.  Placement incentives, not included specifically in the 
contract but centered on growers in need of a capital upgrade, could have the same effect.   
  Solutions at different levels of integrator slaughter capacity suggest there can be a risk 
lowering component to the placement incentive.  Top growers had a considerably narrower band 
of revenue possibilities over different levels of integrator capacity than did the mid-range 
growers.  This was attributed to the fact that changes in integrator capacity jeopardize the size 
and frequency of placements the mid-range growers while revenue differences among the top 
growers were affected only by the optimal pool compositions.  One possibility is to extend the   18 
programming framework of this study to address integrator profit maximization and examine the 
extent to which variation in final product price passes through as placement risk for the different 
grower types.  The major difficulty with a profit maximization model is that integrator capacity 
would be endogenous.  This would require a nonlinear constraint, and make it more difficult to 
find solutions to the model with available solvers.   
  We contend that our model and assumptions behind it are a reasonable approximation of 
a typical grow-out situation; however, as with any model it represents an abstraction from reality.  
Many broiler contracts stipulate bonus payments in terms of a median standard cost or an 
adjusted average computed after eliminating extraordinarily high and low cost flocks.  Our 
decision to compute bonus payments from a simple average is due to practical considerations in 
formulating a math program but still reflects the essential feature of actual broiler tournaments.  
We might provide a better approximation of the real world by estimating different average bird 
weights by grower type and using these in the model.  For example, low cost growers, those with 
better feed conversion rates, would have heavier birds at settlement time than high cost growers.  
By using a constant average weight, the revenue curve is likely biased upwards for high cost 
growers and downwards for low cost growers.  The basic features of the incentive structure 
would be the same.  We also recognize that the number of grower type classifications is 
somewhat arbitrary, but a larger or smaller number of grower types does not alter the main 
conclusion that variable placements can differentiate incentives by grower cost type.  This 
conclusion would be largely unaffected if different assumptions were made about minimum and 
maximum placement times, the base payment, etc.     19 
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Table 1.  Coefficient Tableau for Minimum Flock Placement Constraints 
j/j  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11    N-2  N-1  N 
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  …  0  0  0 
2  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  …  0  0  0 
3  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  …  0  0  0 
4  0  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  …  0  0  0 
M                               
N-1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  …  0  1  1 
N  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  …  0  0  1 
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Table 2. Grower costs and capacity by type 
Grower 
type 
Standard cost  
($ per lb. live weight) 
Percent   Grow-out capacity  
(# of birds) 
1  0.210  1.67          160,320  
2  0.215  1.68          161,280  
3  0.220  4.80          460,800  
4  0.225  10.60        1,017,600  
5  0.230  24.00        2,304,000  
6  0.235  27.67        2,656,320  
7  0.240  15.96        1,532,160  
8  0.245  7.15          686,400  
9  0.250  2.45          235,200  
10  0.255  2.01          192,960  
11  0.260  2.01          192,960  
Totals    100.00        9,600,000  
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Pct. MR of 
$0.005 cost 
reduction 
DP×Q  DQ×P  DP×DQ 
1  1.67   $ 0.210    $ 0.0600          7.43    $ 40,114            
2  1.68      0.215       0.0578          7.43       38,629         1,486           3.85     1,486            -            -   
3  4.80      0.220       0.0508          7.43       33,949         4,680         13.79     4,680            -            -   
4  10.60      0.225       0.0462          7.43       30,859         3,090         10.01     3,090            -            -   
5  24.00      0.230       0.0442          7.43       29,551         1,308           4.43     1,308            -           -   
6  27.67      0.235       0.0368          7.07       23,414         6,137         26.21     4,721     1,178        238  
7  15.96      0.240       0.0346          4.62       14,397         9,017         62.63        904     7,633        479  
8  7.15      0.245       0.0302          4.62       12,557         1,840         14.66     1,840            -            -   
9  2.45      0.250       0.0300          4.62       12,480              77           0.62          77            -            -   
10  2.01      0.255       0.0300          4.62       12,480               -                 -            -             -            -   
11  2.01      0.260       0.0300          4.62       12,480               -                 -            -             -            -   
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Empirical CDF Grower Types
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Figure 2.  Grower revenues and payments at baseline integrator capacity of 1.2 million birds/week 
 
 
Solution to math program Constant 8 weeks  placements for each grower type
Revenue curve Revenue curve
Payment curve Payment curve























































































is binding for all 63 
pools
44 percent 
of growers   25 
Figure 3.  Range of grower revenues at for baseline capacity and capacities above and below baseline 
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